Media Chic by Whitehead, Clay T
Media Chic
Presidential Television. By Newton N. Minow, John Bartlow Martin
& Lee M. Mitchell. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973. Pp. xv, 232.
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Reviewed by Clay T. Whiteheadt
Within a relatively short time television has grown from insignifi-
cance to nearly total pervasiveness. Since the early 1950's we have
become accustomed to this new medium, using it more hours each
day' and increasingly relying upon it for advertising, entertainment,
news, and political debate. Not surprisingly, the new medium and
Presidents have found over the years a mutual attraction. Presidents
need television to reach the electorate, and the TV medium finds
presidential words and actions great "copy" (to stretch only slightly
the newspaper term).
Presidential Television2 documents the steadily expanding use of
television by incumbent American Presidents. Following an analysis
of the political implications and potential dangers of this phenome-
non, the authors reach what seems to be the main point of the book:
a series of proposals aimed at mandating an approximate equality of
simultaneous television network time among the President, the Con-
gress, and the party in opposition to the President.
The authors point out that the concern of the Framers of the Con-
stitution was not that the President would become too powerful, but
that he would not be noticed at all among the numerous members of
Congress, whose personal constituencies would make them more
powerful as a group. 3 Today, the authors maintain, the President has
confounded the Framers' predictions by becoming the most visible,
and therefore most powerful, politician in the country. They set out
t Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy, The Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, Washington, D.C. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of William
Adams.
1. Total television viewing per home has been estimated to have reached 6 hours, 20
minutes per day in the over 60 million homes in the United States having television
receivers. BROADCASTING MAG., BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 12 (1974).
2. N. MINOW, J. MARTIN & L. MITCHELL, PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION (1973) [herein-
after cited to page number only].
3. Pp. 102-03, citing THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Hamilton sees a natural tendency of
legislative authority to "intrude upon the rights and absorb the powers of the other
departments').
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to show that it is largely because of the visibility resulting from his
frequent use and masterful manipulation of television that he out-
shines the Congress and the courts and leaves his opposition far behind.
The proposals advanced by the authors aim at correcting this situa-
tion, as they perceive it, by "balancing" presidential use of television
in four ways: (1) simultaneously broadcasting live on all television
networks during prime time at least four evening congressional ses-
sions each year; (2) granting to the national committee of the largest
political party opposing the President an automatic legal right of reply
to presidential addresses during an election year and near the time
of off-year congressional elections, under the same conditions of cover-
age that the President enjoyed; (3) televising voluntary debates be-
tween spokesmen of the two major parties two to four times annually;
and (4) providing free time simultaneously on the three networks to
all presidential candidates according to a formula giving equal time
to the major party candidates and lesser amounts of time to minor
candidates.4 The authors recommend that the equal time provision5
and the Fairness Doctrine not be applied to these broadcasts, in order
to avoid legal challenges and to prevent the President from demand-
ing more time to reply to them.0
Unfortunately, the authors confuse the causes and the effects of the
phenomenon they call "presidential television." Because they deal
almost exclusively with effects, their recommendations, and especially
their proposed changes in communications law, smack of tinkering
and manipulation rather than the redress of constitutional imbalances.
The authors blame the President's frequent television appearances for
what they consider his undue power over public opinion in compari-
son with that of Congress and the opposition party. This conclusion is
inaccurate in two respects. First, the present authority and prominence
of the presidency result not from television but from the historical
growth of the involvement of the federal government, and thus of the
4. This last proposal was earlier developed in THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN CoSTs IN THE ELECTRONIC ERA, VoTERS' TIME (1969). This review
will not discuss the proposals developed originally in that study. The authors also
recommend that to preserve its judicial integrity, the Supreme Court should continue
to avoid television coverage, while taking some steps to improve general press coverage
of its functioning. Pp. 92-102.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
6. For a summary of the authors' proposals, see pp. 161-63.
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Executive, in national and international affairs.7 Second, the Presi-
dent does not have control over the total amount and nature of his
coverage on television, and there is no assurance that he will benefit
from the exposure he does receive.
As the nation and the federal government both grew, so also did
the power of the presidency. For the first 160 years of our constitutional
history, this growth was unaided by television. By the dawn of the
era of presidential television in 1947, when President Truman made
an address from the White House to launch the Food Conservation
Program,8 the fears of the Framers that the President would be an
obscure and unnoticed figure had long been put to rest.
Because of the inherent nature of the office, a Chief Executive is
able to supervise or control detailed administrative matters and to act
quickly and decisively in circumstances where the pace of national and
international events is too rapid for the more contemplative Congress.
In both situations, the pragmatic approach of Congress has been to
delegate increasing authority to the President in order to allow effec-
tive action. Congress has also deliberately accepted certain methods
of conducting business which allow the President to set much of its
agenda; a large portion of the congressional year is devoted to con-
sideration of the President's budget and legislative proposals. Congress
has an even lesser role in international relations, where the President
has a constitutional primacy.9 Not surprisingly, much of the coverage
of the President on national television has focused on foreign affairs. 10
The coverage of the President in all the mass media, including
television, reflects his importance, prestige, and newsworthiness in
national and foreign affairs. The President's central role is evidenced
by the fact that he regularly gets headline coverage in the more than
60 million newspaper copies printed daily in the United States, 1 as
7. The authors almost entirely ignore these factors in their concern with television.
There are only occasional, brief admissions that other factors even exist. "Because he
can act while his adversaries can only talk, because he can make news and draw at-
tention to himself, and because he is the only leader elected by all the people, an
incumbent president always has had an edge over his opposition in persuading public
opinion. Presidential television, however, has enormously increased that edge." Pp. 10-11.
"Presidential power has expanded because of the growth in national involvement in
foreign affairs, because of the increasing role of the federal government in national
life, especially in social services, and because television has given the presidept more
access than Congress to the public." P. 103. Even in these statements, however, tele-
vision is still portrayed as the most significant factor.
8. P. 33.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
10. For one illustration that coverage is predominantly on foreign affairs, see note
14 infra. In addition, there has been extensive coverage of presidential actions in areas
where Congress has delegated authority to the President, for example, wage and price
regulation during the Nixon Administration.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERcE, PocKEr DATA BOOK 296 (1973).
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well as extensive coverage in the national news and opinion magazines.
The authors recognize the fact that "[a]lmost anything the President
does is news."' 12 If "the modem trend in American government is
towards an increasingly powerful president and an increasingly weak
Congress,"' 13 then television, like the other mass media, has only re-
flected that trend.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the President's use of tele-
vision confers any kind of political omnipotence. The political and
social forces in this country are sufficiently diffuse to prevent presi-
dential control of public opinion, and therefore, despite his use of
television, the President may be defeated on unpopular policies and
programs. For example, most of President Nixon's first term television
addresses dealt with his Vietnam policies, which nevertheless remained
less popular than most of his other domestic and foreign policies.' 4
More powerful countervailing forces were acting concurrently to di-
minish any television advantage that the President might have enjoyed.
Despite the significant amount of attention he gets, the President
does not control television coverage. He is covered by the networks
and local stations at the discretion of their own independent news
departments, and has no right to demand television time.1 Further-
more, congressmen and other public figures frequently appear on tele-
vision, and the views and activities of the President's opponents are
regularly reported. In fact, if all programming is considered, senators
and representatives appear on television much more frequently than
the President.16
12. By virtue of his office, the President of the United States-its constitutional
leader, supreme military commander, chief diplomat and administrator, and pre-
eminent social host-obviously ranks higher in the scale of newsworthiness than
anyone else-defeated opposition candidate, national party chairman, governor,
congressman, senator.
A. ,presidential press conference is clearly news. So is his television address, a re-
port of it will be on page 1 in tomorrow's newspapers. A presidential speech
broadcast only on radio will be reported in the television news.
P. 21.
13. P. 103.
14. As of April 30, 1972, President Nixbn had preempted network programming a
total of 19 times to make addresses to the nation. Ten of these addresses, more than
half, dealt with Vietnam or Southeast Asia policy. This subject, to which he devoted
by far the most attention, never received as much public support as the authors' no-
tion of the power of presidential television might predict.
15. At times, the President has had to bargain with the networks for a desired
television time spot. The authors relate that an Eisenhower speech on the Quemoy-
Matsu crisis was delayed until after prime time, while President Kennedy had to post-
pone a speech designed to prevent racial violence at the University of Mississippi from
8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. (by which time rioting had already started). P. 35.
16. In 1973 alone:
[W]ell over 150 different Congressional spokesmen appeared on the NBC Television
Network in more than 1,000 separate appearances of varying lengths. By contrast,
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Even if the television news departments of the three national net-
works failed to provide such extensive coverage of Congress, and the
local TV stations on their own news shows did not cover their local
senators and representatives, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's (FCC's) Fairness Doctrine would provide a regulatory check on
presidential television. 17 In 1970, the FCC recognized that the large
number of presidential addresses presented an unusual situation trig-
gering television fairness obligations even when all other program-
ming was nearly balanced.' 8
The impression left by the authors overstates the President's tele-
vision advantage over Congress and the opposition party. If television
under proper circumstances can be an electronic throne for the Presi-
dent, it can also be an electronic booby trap awaiting a chance slip
or slur in an offhand remark, thereby causing an explosion of indigna-
tion or outrage and a consequent drop in the public opinion polls.
No President has been uniformly effective in his television appear-
ances. 1 It is perhaps the unique intimacy conveyed by television that
is responsible for its capacity to betray both the serious and the super-
the President appeared approximately 148 times (of which about 20% were cere-
monial occasions).
J. Goodman, President of NBC, Statement Before the Jt. Comm. on Cong. Operations,
Mar. 7, 1974, at 4 (hearings to be published).
The CBS Evening News broadcast six nights a week to 18 million people a night
included 222 interviews with or appearances by members of Congress from June
1, 1973, to last week [the week prior to Feb. 21, 1974] .... In addition there were
hundreds of other reports of Congressional activity on the CBS Evening News during
that period.
In 1973, for example, there were 31 appearances by members of Congress on
Face the Nation alone.
A. Taylor, President of CBS, Statement Before the Jt. Comm. on Cong. Operations,
Feb. 21, 1974, at 2 (hearings to be published). Since June 1973, CBS has also imple-
mented a more expansive reply policy for leading opposition figures to reply to presi-
dential messages. Id. at 5.
17. The statutory basis for the Fairness Doctrine is the Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1970), but in reality the doctrine is an administrative concept grounded
in the "public interest" standard governing broadcast regulation. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1970).
The doctrine requires that if a broadcaster gives time to present one side of a "con-
troversial issue of public importance," he must provide a reasonable opportunity for
the presentation of conflicting viewpoints. He must provide free time if paid sponsors
are not available. There is no "equal time" requirement, and the broadcaster deter-
mines what time will be provided for the reply, the format to be used, and who
the spokesmen for the other side will be. No individual or group has a right to time
under the Fairness Doctrine, which is concerned only with the presentation of issues.
See, e.g., Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues
of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969) (Fairness Doctrine held constitutional).
It should be noted that this reviewer recommends abolition of the Fairness Doctrine
because of the opportunities it creates for bureaucratic and political second-guessing of
editorial judgments.
18. Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 19 P &- F RADIo
REG. 2D 1103 (1970).
19. See, e.g., pp. 37, 40, 47, 48, 50-54, 58.
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ficial weaknesses of a politician. The authors attribute the fall of
Senator Joseph McCarthy in the mid-1950's to this effect.20 On a more
subtle level the authors suggest that President Johnson's continued
inability to use television to bridge what became known as his cred-
ibility gap marked his failure to win support for his Vietnam policies
and caused his political power to wane.2 1 Perhaps this was also due to
extensive television coverage of the application and effects of those
policies.
Finally, having more to lose than to gain, an incumbent President
nearing election time may choose to avoid the risks of television ap-
pearances in the hope that his opponent will be discredited and under-
mined by using television.2 2 Such a practice is wholly inconsistent
with the authors' notion of television's invariably favorable influence
on public opinion and political forces.
II
The authors' first proposal for ending the imbalance in television
exposure is that Congress should permit television "on the floor of
the House and Senate for the broadcast of specially scheduled prime-
time evening sessions .... -23 At least four times per year, these are to
be carried live by the three major networks simultaneously. "These
broadcasts should be exempt from the 'equal time' law and the fair-
ness and political party doctrines." 24 Staging special evening sessions
for television coverage appears well within the power of Cbngress
and, at least at the outset, sufficiently interesting to warrant the three-
network, simultaneous, prime-time coverage the authors seek to
achieve. 25 But the wisdom and propriety of such a congressional ma-
neuver simply to counteract the President's use of television is doubt-
ful.
20. P. 107.
21. See p. 47.
22. See, e.g., p. 58.
23. Pp. 122, 161.
24. Pp. 124, 161. The Fairness Doctrine is discussed in note 17 supra. The "equal
opportunities" provision, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970), applies only to actual candidates dur-
ing an election campaign. The political party doctrine, a creation of FCC case law,
provides that if one major party is given or sold time to discuss candidates or election
issues, the other party must be given, or allowed to buy, time (but not necessarily
equal time). Pp. 87-89.
25. Prime time is defined as the peak television 'iewing hours for evening enter-
tainment, generally 7:00-11:00 p.m. It is interesting to note that the only hour which
is prime time for the entire nation is 10:00-11:00 p.m., easterA time. The suggested
live sessions would have to begin late in the evening in Washington, D.C., to reach
west coast viewers during prime time.
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While discussing ways to give Congress access to the media, the
authors never really address the question of how congressional tele-
vision will counteract presidential television, and their conclusion
that "Congress needs television" 26 is therefore without force. Since
Congress is by nature pluralistic, many of the recent attempts of its
members to present unified fronts have necessarily expressed only
the least common denominator of their views and thus those efforts
have lacked the impact of a singly-spoken presidential statement.27
It is hard to see how the prime-time congressional specials could be
much better, unless carefully staged by the majority party leaders;
yet if the specials were actually staged, both viewers and news com-
mentators might see them as contrived performances. These special
congressional sessions are therefore unlikely to improve significantly
the image of Congress or provide an effective means of expressing
opposition to the President.
In practice, it is doubtful that this proposal would result in the
long-run balance to presidential television the authors seek. More
often than not, Congress and the White House have been held by the
same party, a situation that tould give even greater exposure to the
President's position and put the opposition party at a more serious
television disadvantage when it is perhaps most dangerous to do so.
The authors also suggest that the congressional coverage under their
proposal be exempt from the Fairness Doctrine. If the President and
the congressional majority were of the same party, the President's
opponents would not be represented by the televised congressional
sessions, and they would lose the opportunity under the Fairness Doc-
trine to have these programs balanced by presentation of conflicting
views.20 Moreover, if a broadcaster in this situation voluntarily at-
temped to balance the exempt congressional coverage by giving time to
opponents of the President, there would be a danger that supporters of
the President's policies might try to apply the Fairness Doctrine to this
nonexempt coverage, forcing the broadcaster to give still more time to
the presidential position.
Furthermore, this proposal seems to require the networks to broad-
26. P. 121.
27. Pp. 125, 130. In describing the attempts of Democratic party leaders to present
opposition to President Nixon's Vietnam policy, the authors observe that the "quest
for a consensus resulted in a watered-down response that George Reedy, President
Johnson's former press secretary, said 'sounds like yapping' to most television viewers."
P. 130. The authors also observe that the diversity within Congress creates severe
limitations on its ability to rebut presidential television. P. 121.
28. See p. 1755 supra.
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cast these congressional sessions. This raises the specter of government
compelling its own coverage, a dangerous precedent. Currently, one
of the checks on the political use of television is that the President
and Congress can only request time, and the networks can therefore
negotiate over the time of day and amount of time given.29 This pro-
tection would be removed if either the President or Congress were
permitted to demand television time.
The authors have not given sufficient weight to First Amendment
interests in their proposal to broadcast congressional sessions. A better
solution, if Congress wishes to be more accessible to all of the media,30
would be to permit journalists to cover whatever congressional activities
they consider newsworthy by means of print, radio, or television. Ade-
quate television coverage of Congress could best be encouraged through
improvement of congressional procedures. One proposal is to institute
several reforms, including restructuring committees to remove overlap-
ping jurisdictions, developing a more efficient method for reviewing the
President's budget proposals, and coordinating the actions of the
House and Senate, in the hope that such reforms would increase the
visibility of Congress and make it easier for the press to cover con-
gressional activities. 31 Constructive proposals of this nature might
profitably be undertaken before Congress schedules its debut on live,
prime-time television.
When Congress does something newsworthy, it invariably receives
broad coverage. All that Congress needs to do is open its doors, if it
decides that the public needs "congressional television." Journalists
should be left to take care of the rest. Congress has no need to demand
or legislatively require television coverage.
29. See, e.g., note 15 supra.
30. C. Edward Little, President of the Mutual Broadcasting System, points out that
in 1972 congressional committees conducted 40 percent of hearings and other meetings
behind closed doors. He notes encouragingly, however, that the trend towards closed
meetings is being partially reversed in recent months. C. Little, Statement Before the
Jt. Comm. on Cong. Operations, Feb. 21, 1974 (hearings to be published), citing 28
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 93 (1972).
31. Rep. J. Cleveland, Statement Before the Jt. Comm. on Cong. Operations, Feb.
20, 1974, at 5 (hearings to be published).
But the final passage of a bill or a successful investigation are only parts of
the legislative drama. The rest of the performance must also be comprehensible-
both to achieve quality and to communicate effectively.
Reform can achieve this objective. The restructuring of committees, for example,
can reduce overlapping jurisdictions, clarify responsibility, improve oversight, and
encourage more rational planning-all of which would heighten the visibility of
committee work and make it more accessible to the media, as well as produce a
higher quality legislative product.
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III
The next major proposal the authors develop is that:
[T]he national committee of the opposition party should be given
by law an automatic right of response to any presidential radio or
television address made during the ten months preceding a presi-
dential election or within 90 days preceding a Congressional elec-
tion in nonpresidential years. 32
Suggesting amendment of § 315 of the Communications Act of 1934,33
the authors propose that every broadcaster or cablecaster who carries
a presidential appearance within the expanded response period pro-
vide "equal opportunities to the national committee of the political
party whose nominee for President received the second highest num-
ber of ... votes"34 in the most recent presidential election. The equal
opportunities and fairness provisions are to be suspended for this
reply by the opposition.35 The purpose of this proposal is "to insure
equality in the electoral use of television." 36
If such a proposal were implemented, the result would be the re-
placement of editorial judgment in campaign coverage by a mechanical
rule. It is no doubt true that fairness and objectivity are often lacking
in network coverage of political parties and candidates. It seems more
likely, however, that even with the limited diversity of only three net-
works, day-to-day news selection based on a reasoned, professional
judgment is superior to the mechanical application of a law which
forces broadcasters automatically to present spokesmen selected by the
opposition party.
One need not peer far into the past to find examples of the potential
mischievousness of such a law. When President Johnson was pursuing
his Vietnam policies, most of the effective opposition was in his own
party, while Republicans were generally less critical of the war. Since
the proposed law would not limit the other party to the issues dis-
cussed by the President, the Republicans could have eschewed any
discussion of the war and instead attacked the President on some un-
related and perhaps less important issue. Ultimately, the war would
have been opposed less effectively by the President's real opposition
in the time remaining to the networks for coverage of other news topics.
32. P. 161.
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On the whole, granting the party out of power a right of free reply
will make political debate in America more partisan and institutional
rather than philosophical and issue-oriented.37 Such a provision may
lock the current political scene into law by narrowing the range of
expression to established partisans. Similarly, this proposal could hurt
insurgent candidates running independently of the backing of party
regulars by giving each national committee the power to select party
spokesmen. Television debate of political issues is not likely to be
strengthened by giving so much television control to the party regu-
lars on the national committees.
The "opposition" to the President's policies can come from many
sources. Whether that opposition is the other party, a local official, or
the heir apparent within the President's own party, the wiser choice is
to seek conditions under which each such group can receive news cover-
age to the extent that it is newsworthy and can also have a right to buy
television time for itself. This latter issue of access rights, which
would in many ways help achieve the authors' objectives, is explored
in more detail below.
IV
The authors propose also that "National Debates" among spokes-
men of the national political parties be established on a voluntary
basis for all concerned, with the stipulation that they be shown live
during prime time with simultaneous major network coverage.38
Designed to facilitate the development of party positions, a dubious
goal in itself, the debates would more than likely lead to many of the
same results as the proposals for "opposition television" that were criti-
cized above.
Political debates have always been voluntary for both participants
and broadcasters. There has seldom been any hesitancy on the part
of broadcasters to stage debates. The problem is that the incumbent,
usually much better known, is often understandably reluctant to help
provide an equal forum for his opponents. The National Debates
would frequently meet the same obstacle. It is likely that they would
never take place except when the strategies of all candidates coincide.
Such debates therefore could never play a major role in balancing
presidential television appearances.
37. The present Fairness Doctrine, in contrast, requires a balance of issues, not
personalities or parties.
38. Pp. 155, 162.
1760
Vol. 83: 1751, 1974
Media Chic
The authors would vest in the national committees of each party the
power to choose the spokesmen who will participate in these debates.
They suppose that the "most arresting personalities and best debaters
will be chosen." 39 More likely, the division within the national com-
mittees will often lead to compromise spokesmen noted only for their
lack of further political ambition.40 Without the charismatic figures
that television seems to require, the debates would probably languish
very low in viewer popularity-except for those few occasions when
they would have been interesting enough to command coverage
anyway.
V
In developing their recommendations for giving television reply
time to Congress and the opposition party, the authors almost com-
pletely ignore the question of allowing a private right of access. 41
Giving access to groups other than Congress and the opposition party
would make it possible to provide exposure for a wider range of
political opinions. Had the authors considered the access issue in light
of theories of broadcasting regulation and the requirements of the
First Amendment, their recommendations might have been far dif-
ferent.
Despite the demand for some form of access by private groups, the
Supreme Court ruled in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic
National Committee42 that broadcaster refusal to allow paid access to
the airwaves in the form of "editorial advertisements" did not violate
the First Amendment or the broadcasters' statutory duty43 to act
"in the public interest." The Court, in considering the possibility
of creating such a private right of access, said that it was necessary
to weigh the interests in free expression of the public, the broad-
caster, and the individual seeking access. It then held that the Congress
was not unjustified in concluding that the interests of the public
would be best served by giving full journalistic discretion to broad-
casters, with the only check on the exercise of that discretion being
39. P. 155.
40. Conversely, if each party chose several spokesmen to represent various wings of
the party, the debates could become little more than intraparty quarrels.
41. "Private right of access" refers to the practice of allowing individuals and
groups to purchase television time to broadcast their views on politics or other subjects.
42. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The Court overturned a ruling by the court of appeals that
a flat ban on paid editorial announcements violates the First Amendment, at least when
other sorts of paid announcements are accepted. Business Executives Move for Vietnam
Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1970).
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the FCC's public interest regulation of broadcasters. The majority
opinion pointed out that choosing a method of providing access to
individuals and private groups that relied on detailed oversight by
a regulatory agency would simply increase government interference
in program content, in view of the need to create regulations govern-
ing which persons or groups would have a limited right of access. 44
The Court stated, however, that the access question might be re-
solved differently in the future: "Conceivably at some future date
Congress or the Commission-or the broadcasters-may devise some
kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable."45
The appearance of Presidential Television revives the concerns that
took Democratic National Committee to the Supreme Court. The
growing role of broadcasting in American politics, together with the
increasing clamor for some form of access, may justify legislative re-
examination of whether the broadcaster should be required in selling
his commercial time46 to accept all paid announcements without dis-
crimination as to the speaker or the subject matter.47 In this way, paid
editorial announcements would stand on an equal footing with paid
commercials and paid campaign advertisements. The broadcaster
would sell advertising time exclusively on the basis of availability, the
same way that newspapers and magazines sell advertising space. All
44. 412 U.S. at 126-27. The Supreme Court distinguished this type of "right of
access" from enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine, which the Court described as in-
volving only a review of the broadcaster's overall performance and "sustained good
faith effort" to inform the public fully and fairly. However, the Court apparently
was unaware of the gradual shift away from general enforcement of the Fairness
Doctrine towards specific, case-by-case and issue-by-issue implementation. See Blake,
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the Emperor's New Clothes, 23 FED.
Com. B.J. 75 (1969); Goldberg. A Proposal to Deregulate Broadcast Programming, 42
GEo. WAsH. L. REy. 73, 88 (1973); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Ob.
servations on Forty Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67
(1967); Scalia, Don't Go Near the Water, 25 Fm. CoNT. B.J. 111, 113 (1972), quoting
Paul Porter from Hearings on the Fairness Doctrine Before the Special Subcommittee
on Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 153 (1968). In effect, this shift in the method of enforcement has
made the Fairness Doctrine similar to the type of "right of access" mechanism that
the Court in Democratic National Committee said would regiment broadcasters to the
detriment of the First Amendment. 412 U.S. at 127.
45. 412 U.S. at 131.
46. This proposal is limited to time reserved for paid commercials, not program
time. A broadcaster would not be compelled to preempt regular programming. Com-
mercial time on television falls generally in the range of 9 to 16 minutes per hour.
The voluntary code of the National Association of Broadcasters allows nine minutes
per hour during prime time, BROADCASTING MAG., supra note 1; the amount of commer-
cial time is greater during other times of the day.
47. Under present government regulation, the broadcaster is legally responsible for
his commercial time as well as his program material. In a system of paid access, it
may be sufficient that individuals and groups are civilly liable for slander, obscenity,
false or deceptive advertising, incitement to riot, or other offenses, and therefore the
broadcaster should perhaps be relieved of liability for any infractions of law by users
of the station's facilities.
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persons able and willing to pay would have an equal opportunity to
present their views on television.48
This kind of access right would be compatible with the policy con-
cerns of the Supreme Court in Democratic National Committee.49
This proposal would require no additional government administration
or interference. Exempting access announcements from the Fairness
Doctrine would cause a minimum of dislocation to the broadcaster's
regular programming. 0 Moreover, broadcasters would not give up any
significant control over substantive programming if the right of access
were limited to commercial time. Both the journalistic freedom of the
broadcaster and the interest of members of the public in obtaining
television time are therefore protected by the creation of this limited
right of access.'
By meeting some of the public demand for an electronic forum, de-
velopments in communications technology such as cable television will
in the future almost surely reduce the hazards, real or imagined, from
48. This should not cause an unfair discrimination against groups which lack funds.
Considering the amount of contributions which television appeals can attract, it is
likely that any group with something important to say could raise money for the an-
nouncements by an on-the-air appeal. See, e.g., p. 118 (an antiwar group paid $60,000
for time, but received $400,000 in contributions). Small, unpopular, or extremist groups
might have trouble raising funds, but regrettably some of these groups probably would
also be denied time under the present Fairness Doctrine. Poor groups whose views were
not represented on programming time would be able to compel at least some coverage
of their views through enforcement of the broadcaster's statutory responsibilities.
49. In fact, this would conflict less with Democratic National Committee than would
the authors' proposals, which show little regard for the public interest or the journalistic
freedom of the broadcaster. The authors would take from the broadcaster control over
large blocks of time now devoted to program material, and give it to groups which
the FCC could not hold accountable under the publ:c interest standard. This was one
reason the Court accepted the FCC's refusal to require public access in Democratic
National Committee. 412 U.S. at 125.
50. If the Fairness Doctrine were applied to paid political advertisements, the broad-
caster might be forced to provide free time for replies during regular programming
time. 412 U.S. at 123-24 (the Court apparently did not decide whether the FCC would
be permitted or required to extend the Fairness Doctrine to paid political advertise-
ments). This possibility would be avoided by explicitly exempting these announcements
from the Fairness Doctrine as part of the proposal. Such an exemption, of course, need
not affect application of the Fairness Doctrine to product advertisements. Banzhaf v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). In addition, this
proposal would leave the license renewal process available as a recourse in cases of
extreme program imbalance.
The Fairness Doctrine, moreover, is not the source of this right of access. To use
the Fairness Doctrine to justify a private right of access is to give it a function for
which it was never intended.
51. In contrast, giving an unlimited right of access during regular programming
time could remove a large amount of time from the control of the broadcaster and
give it to individuals or groups. Since even proponents of access agree that this would
be undesirable, they recommend more "limited" rights of individual access. But then
it would be necessary to have detailed FCC-enforced regulations and standards to de-
termine who would be entitled to time and which time slots would be made available.
A right of access so constrained would result in the same type of governmental control
over program content that was condemned in Democratic National Committee, 412
U.S. at 126.
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presidential television5 2 In the meantime, the more limited medium
of broadcast television must be made more responsive to individuals
and groups seeking to express their points of view. The method by
which this is done is crucial. Access can either be given on an ad hoc
basis to those groups powerful enough to command it legally (such
as Congress and the opposition party), as the authors suggest, or it can
be sold on a nondiscriminatory basis. Only the latter proposal would
be an improvement over the present system.
VI
The thrust of all of the authors' proposals is toward dictating to
television viewers what they are to see, with paternalistic disregard for
their actual desires. In doing so, the authors have lost sight of the sub-
stantial journalistic function that broadcasters share with publishers.
Newspapers devote their space to those issues and events that the
editors feel the readers will find most important. The more impor-
tant the event, the more prominent is its position in more news-
papers. No one tells a newspaper how many column-inches to devote
to a certain topic, and certainly there is no law requiring the periodic
coverage of specified events regardless of their newsworthiness.
To be sure, the "broadcasters' First Amendment" has come to be
viewed 53 as an abridged version of the original one.54 It is crucial,
however, that intrusions on journalistic expression be severely lim-
ited. Most of the authors' proposals would impinge on free journalistic
expression at a time when ways should be found to help preserve that
expression. Indeed, the inevitable arbitrariness and complexity of such
proposals provide the best arguments against legal controls over the
use of television. The proposals go well beyond what is necessary to
achieve many of the authors' goals and, unfortunately, fail to concen-
trate on the development of a general system of access that would be
better designed to achieve those goals.
The major criticism of the authors' proposals, though, is that they
52. While the authors include cable systems in their suggestions, it is doubtful that
anyone, including the President, should appear simultaneously on all of the potentially
numerous networks in a medium of channel abundance like cable. It is also doubtful
that all cable network organizations should be required to give free time to Congress or
opposition parties, since there should be sufficient time for sale to accommodate every-
one. Cable television, therefore, should be exempt from the programming requirements
proposed by the authors.
53. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) (the right of
the viewers and listeners is paramount to that of the broadcaster).
54. The First Amendment commands that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging
freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
1764
Vol. 83: 1751, 1974
Media Chic
would impair rather than expand the ability of television to evolve
into a medium reflecting a wide range of perspectives on the American
social and political scene. With the extreme economic concentration
of control over television programming by the three national net-
worksr and the growing scope of FCC programming regulations,56
we are already moving toward control of national television program-
ming by a familiar coalition of big business and big government. Pro-
posals such as those in this book serve only to entrench such a system
and to constrain the diversity and free choice that should characterize
American television.
Presidential Television provides an interesting and valuable addi-
tion to the literature on national politics by documenting the suc-
cesses and failures of the evolving strategies that Presidents have de-
vised in their efforts to adapt to the new television medium. But in
the end, the authors fail to demonstrate the validity of their asser-
tion that television has significantly and permanently altered the ebb
and flow of America's political forces. We are left with presidential
television as a still-evolving form, mastered neither by news depart-
ments nor Presidents, clearly something different from presidential
radio and presidential headlines, very much a part of our political
process, but hardly a fundamental threat to our constitutional system.
The authors have discovered the dangers inherent in excessive con-
centration of presidential power. But, in seeking to check this power,
they have chosen a course at variance with our most fundamental
First Amendment principles, undermining the ultimate check on po-
litical power-an electorate that informs itself through a press unre-
strained by government prescription.
55. The three networks originate about 64 percent of all programming for af-
filiated stations. BROADCASTING MAC., supra note 1, at 70. The percentage is higher
during evening prime-time hours. Of the 700 commercial stations operating as of April
30, 1974, BROADcAsriNG MAG., June 3, 1974, at 40, only about 80 are not affiliated with
the networks. Station ownership is also highly concentrated:
Each of the networks owns the legal maximum of 5 VHF stations. Since these are
in the largest cities, networks reach 25 to 35 percent of all TV homes with their
own stations.
R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. NfcGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 16 (1973).
56. See, e.g., Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 19154, 27 FCC 2d 580 (1971) (recom-
mended percentages of certain types of programming); Further Notice of Inquiry in
Docket No. 19154, 31 FCC 2d 443 (1971) (same); Report and Order Docket No. 19622,
29 P & F RADiO REG. 2D 643 (1974) (prime-time access restrictions on network pro-
gramming).
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